Th is article examines two instances of violent internal rebellion (Ivory Coast and the Philippines) that have escalated in intensity to the level of domestic insurgencies. Each insurgency operates on behalf of a population that has articulated claims of religious and ethnic discrimination by the state. In each case, the parties to the conflict have jointly approved international mediation of their disputes. In one instance, the mediating effort was repudiated by both parties, while in the other, the mediation process achieved significant progress in obtaining an agreement between the parties. Th e argument herein suggests that this disparity can be explained by examining the pace at which the different mediation teams implemented their effort.
Th e central question examined in this article is why mediators to disputes between an insurgency and a national government are, on occasion, repudiated by one or more of the parties to the conflict. Attempts to mediate between the hostile parties in protracted conflict are fraught with difficulty. A premise associated with any attempted mediation is that both (or all) parties are amenable to the effort. Particular parties in certain conflicts, at certain times, may be more anxious for the mediation to succeed than their adversaries. It is also the case that in certain conflicts the interveners themselves may exhibit a greater sense of urgency regarding the need to reach a settlement than do the parties to the conflict.
Th e insurgents in both of the conflicts examined here appear to believe the government has minimized or insufficiently recognized the Muslim identity of the population the insurgencies purport to represent. Th is failure on the part of the state may be the most "prominent" grievance of the insurgents. Th ere are additional grievances, which may have been mounted by the insurgents in each case. One of these possibilities is a complaint that the state may have discriminated against the population the insurgents claim to represent because of the population's region or place of origin.
A third possible insurgent claim of inequity brought about by the state is based upon lineage differences. It may be possible to attribute to both of the insurgencies of interest here, all three claims of discrimination, one based on religious belief, another on origin, and a third on lineage. Th e claim of ethnic discrimination is brought by the Moros in the Philippines and the Dyulu in Ivory Coast. Th e claim of discrimination based on origin is brought by the "Northerners" in Ivory Coast, and at least a segment of the Mindanao population in the Philippines. Th e claim of religious discrimination is brought by Muslim populations in both countries, who reside mainly in the northern part of Ivory Coast and on the island of Mindanao in the Philippines.
Two Mediations
In the Ivory Coast, the third parties that have taken the lead in mounting mediation efforts are, as follows, the French government of President Jacques Chirac, several member governments of the Economic Organization of West African States (ECOWAS), and the South African government of President Th abo Mbeki, under the auspices of the African Union (AU) (Colombant 2006) . In the Philippines, the third parties that have led mediation efforts are the governments of Malaysia, Brunei, and Libya, the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), (although as an organization, the OIC has had a much less direct mediating role in the Philippines than has ECOWAS or the AU in the Ivory Coast), and through the U.S. Institute of Peace, the United States (although the role of the United States has been relatively oblique) (Jayme 2002; Santos 2005) .
Th e chief demand of the insurgency in the Ivory Coast is not the creation of an autonomous homeland; while, the insurgency in the Philippines possesses this demand as its principal goal. Th e demand for a "homeland," in most forms, is one that is difficult for mediators to persuade central governments to accept (Lapidoth 1997 , Van Horne 1997 . It is the resistance to this demand by the central authorities, in my estimation, that is the major obstacle to a successful mediation in instances of national insurgent conflict. Using the typology provided by Gurr (2000) , the Philippine insurgency could well be characterized as an ethonationalist movement. Such a movement is comprised of a regionally concentrated population with a history of organized political autonomy that has or has had in the past its own regional government or traditional ruler. Significantly, ethnonation-
